Background and context
The Strait of Hormuz has been largely closed to commercial shipping since 28 February 2026, when Iran moved against vessels transiting the waterway in response to US and Israeli air strikes on Iranian targets. The Strait carries approximately a fifth of global oil and LNG supplies, and its disruption has had a significant impact on energy and commodity markets. Since the closure, Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has issued warnings forbidding passage.
The IRGC was itself designated a terrorist organisation by the EU on 19 February 2026, bringing it within the scope of the EU's counterterrorism sanctions regime.
Full advisory at the following link.
Below you will find a weekly report dated 3 June 2026, covering the period of 28 May to 3 June, where the following incidents were reported:
Full advisory at the following link.
https://britanniapandi.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/ARC-Weekly-Report-03.06.26.pdf
guidelines for the safe carriage of cocoa butter in freight containers, updating industry practices for one of the sector’s most temperature-sensitive cargoes.
The latest instalment of their Good Catch series, warning that emergency alert functions on ship radios can unintentionally interrupt important communications.
An inland towing vessel was pushing nine loaded barges downriver, approaching a fleeting area just below a bridge. The towing vessel was scheduled to drop off six of the barges and pick up five others before continuing further downriver.
The captain anticipated that tying up would be a little tricky that day due to the strong current and an eddy just above the fleeting area.
To mitigate the risks, he had two deckhands on the lead barges and another halfway to the front of the tow so they could quickly tie up and secure the tow. He had explained his plan to the deckhands, and they took handheld radios with them so he could communicate with them on their working channel.
Just as he was making his final approach to the fleeting area, he heard a distress call on Very High Frequency (VHF) channel 16 regarding a fire on another towing vessel upriver from his location. Almost immediately, he was reassured to hear that other nearby vessels and emergency services were responding.
Seconds later, he radioed his deckhands, but they did not acknowledge his call. He could see them and thought it was strange that they did not react. He repeated his call to them, and still, they did not respond.
Thinking quickly, he gave a toot on the horn to alert them, then shifted to the deck loudhailer to direct the deckhands. It was not ideal, but it worked. They reacted quickly and secured the tow without incident, but the captain experienced several tense moments in the process.
The captain was mad at the deckhands for not responding to his radio calls, but they pointed out that no call came over their handheld radios. When they tested them standing in the wheelhouse, they discovered that the VHF radio in the wheelhouse was on channel 16, while the handheld radios remained on the working channel.
They did not know how that happened, but it explained why the deckhands did not receive his calls on their handheld radios.
Actual damage
None, because of the captain’s quick thinking and decision to use the deck loudhailer.
Potential damage
Had the Captain not acted swiftly, and had the deckhands not responded with equal urgency, one or more deckhands could have been injured from a hard impact, barges could have been damaged, and/or barges could have broken loose and drifted downriver, resulting in additional consequences.
Lessons learned
When you identify a hazard before something goes wrong… it’s a Good Catch.
When you stop an operation before something bad happens… it’s a Good Catch.
When you implement a policy related to turning off the channel 16 “auto switching” function on VHF radios across the fleet… that’s a Good Catch, too!