Loss Prevention Advice
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On August 24, 2026, the U.S. Department of Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued an updated alert concerning the sanctions risks associated with Iranian demands for “toll” payments or other requirements for safe passage through the Strait of Hormuz. On the same date, OFAC issued a determination expanding the application of Executive Order 13902 to the shipping, aviation, digital asset, gold and technology sectors of the Iranian economy.
Key Takeaways for Members: • Strait of Hormuz passage: U.S. and non-U.S. persons face significant sanctions exposure if they deal with the Persian Gulf Strait Authority (PGSA), Persian Gulf Marine Insurance Company (PGMIC), or HormuzSafe Marine Services Authority (Hormuz Safe).
- Safe Passage payments: OFAC warns that sanctions exposure may arise from payments or other forms of value provided in connection with safe passage, including currency, digital assets, offsets, government-to-government arrangements, informal swaps and certain in-kind or purported charitable payments, especially in relation to any one of the above entities. • Insurance and Services: The sanctions risks are not limited to payments. Accepting insurance, other services, or responding to information requests or guarantees concerning safe passage from designated Iranian entities may also result in sanctions exposure. • Enhanced due diligence: Maritime service providers continue to be strongly encouraged to conduct enhanced due diligence on vessels transiting the Strait of Hormuz, including reviewing voyage arrangements, Iranian territorial-water transits, counterparties, safe passage fees and any services or insurance obtained from Iran.
Full advisory at the following link.
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Over the past week, 25-31 August, two incidents of piracy or armed robbery against ships in Asia.
Two CAT 4 incidents of armed robbery against ships2 in Asia were. One incident occurred onboard a bulk carrier while at anchor at southwest of Vung Tau Light House, Vietnam on 23 August 2026.
The other incident occurred onboard a bulk carrier while loading goods at Lubuk Gaung Port, Indonesia on 24 August 2026. The crew were not injured in both incidents despite some ship stores and spare parts of generator were stolen.
Area of concern
The ships shall to continue to intensify vigilance, maintain a sharp look-out while anchoring or transiting areas of concern, including the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, and report all incidents to the law enforcement agencies immediately. The littoral States are advised to increase patrols and enforcement in these areas.
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a preliminary assessment of a serious marine casualty in which a RoPax ferry suffered a hull puncture and engine-room flooding after contacting an unprotected turning fender at Holyhead Port, Wales, on 7 January 2026.
Synopsis
At 0750 on 7 January 2026, the roll-on/roll-off passenger (RoPax) ferry, operating its regular route from Dublin, Ireland, made contact with an unprotected turning fender at the northern extent of Terminal 3 at Holyhead Port, Wales. Before backing in, the ferry had turned to port north of the jetty, during which a tug was made fast on the ferry’s port aft quarter. As the ferry made contact, the ferry’s hull was holed just below the waterline in the starboard engine room and above the waterline on the cargo deck.
The damage caused approximately 500 tonnes of water to flood into the starboard engine room and an unknown quantity to flood into an adjacent void space. The crew responded quickly by shoring up the hull below the waterline, pumping out the spaces and transferring ballast to create a port list and raise the damage to above the waterline.
Once the situation on board was brought under control, the ferry was able to continue berthing and disembark passengers and unload vehicles without significant delay. Holyhead Port was closed to ferry traffic until later that evening, when the ferry was moved to another berth and a damage assessment of the jetty was conducted. No significant damage to the jetty was identified and the terminal was returned to service.
Following temporary repairs, the ferry travelled to a dry dock in Liverpool, England under its own power.
Findings
- Holyhead Port had experienced several ferry-related incidents over the previous year, including contact with Terminal 5 in May 2025, and another in December 2025 that resulted in the ongoing closure of the terminal.
- In July 2025, Holyhead Port Authority issued Local Notice to Mariners 17/2025, advising that the turning fender involved in the incident was not to be used.
- Although the ferry’s master was aware of the requirement to avoid the turning fender during berthing, the vessel closed on the jetty faster than expected, likely due to its position after turning off the jetty and the strong westerly winds blowing onto it.
- The berthing operation was within operating parameters of both the port and the vessel.
- There were instances of conflicting communications between the ferry and the tug.
- The tug effectiveness was limited due to its position on the ferry’s port aft quarter. Any further attempt to use the tug to pull the vessel to port would likely have increased the force of the contact.
- Subsequent inspection of the turning fender revealed several sharp protrusions on the face plate and the absence of a rubber fender structure (see Figure 1).
- The ferry’s crew had no prior awareness of these sharp protrusions or the extent of potential damage they could cause on contact.
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A lesson learned from an incident where the pilot transposed the tug names on his reference card, causing the tugs to receive incorrect orders and resulting in the tanker’s stern striking the berth.
A tanker was preparing for departure at night, with light winds and two tugs alongside to help leave the berth. The Master and pilot had exchanged information on the manoeuvre, including the placement and use of the tugs.
The plan was to use two tugs: one with a line forward near the bow and one with a line aft. The pilot expected the current to be running at about 1.9 knots from stern to bow. Given this, the plan was to have both tugs pull the vessel off the pier together, but with the aft tug pulling faster than the forward tug to open up the stern and have the current help push them off.
Once the tugs had pulled the tanker far enough off the pier to allow a safe departure the tugs would be released.
In his notebook and on the mooring plan diagram of the Master/pilot exchange form, the pilot wrote down the placement and names of each of the two tugs. As was his practice, he also wrote down the names and placement of each tug on a ‘radio card’, (reference card), which he would have with him on the bridge wing for quick reference. Tug DD was at the bow, with tug DC at the stern. It was discovered in the subsequent investigation that he had transposed the name of the two tugs on the radio card.